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Abstract 
Managers’ risk preferences are typically greater than those of debtholders. 
Managers have the potential to gain from risky activities, but debtholders share only in 
the losses. Debtholders recognize their misalignment with managers’ risk preferences 
and assign a higher cost of borrowing or restrict financing to higher-risk firms. Recent 
literature, however, suggests that some managers hold large amounts of debt-based 
compensation (defined benefit pension plans and deferred compensation plans), and 
these managers’ actions more closely align with the preferences of outside debtholders. 
I find that managers with low debt compensation (i.e., those with more agency conflict 
with debtholders) are more likely to use discretionary accruals to opportunistically 
reduce the volatility of underlying performance. These results are consistent with less 
debt-aligned managers attempting to hide excessive risk-taking activities from outside 
debtholders. I also document that such opportunistic smoothing increases with the 
firm’s reliance on debt financing and debtholders’ reliance on financial statement 
information. My study provides evidence on the motive behind managers’ discretionary 
income smoothing behavior based on the notion that insufficient debt-based executive 
compensation results in misalignment between managers and debtholders.
1 
1. Introduction 
In this study, I investigate the informative role versus the opportunistic role 
of income smoothing in a context where managers’ incentive alignment with 
debtholders is expected to vary. The accounting literature offers two opposing 
perspectives on the motives behind managers’ use of discretionary accruals to 
smooth income. On the one hand, managers may be motivated to reduce earnings 
volatility arising from transitory cash flows. Using discretionary accruals to 
smooth transitory effects, managers better signal their expectations of the firm’s 
long-term performance (Demski 1988; Sankar and Subramanyam 2001; 
Kirschenheiter and Melumad 2002). This type of discretionary reporting represents 
an informative role of income smoothing. 
On the other hand, managers sometimes take risky actions that may not be 
in stakeholders’ best interest. As outside stakeholders observe volatile performance 
induced by managerial risk taking, they impose agency costs. Therefore, managers 
have an incentive to conceal the volatility of true underlying performance 
(Trueman and Titman 1988; Leuz et al. 2003; Grant, Markarian, and Parbonetti 
2009). Using discretionary accruals to understate the firm’s true risk represents the 
opportunistic role of income smoothing. 
Prior studies document that managers engage in excessive risk-taking 
activities for various self-interested purposes, such as maximizing personal wealth, 
status, power and prestige (Haugen and Senbet 1981; Guay 1999; Rajgopal and 
Shevlin 2002; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 2006; Chava, Kumar and Warga 2009). 
Whereas managers have the potential to gain from their risky decisions, 
2 
debtholders share only in the losses (Black and Scholes 1973; Merton 1976).
1
 
Thus, an agency conflict is created when managers and outside debtholders lack 
incentive alignment (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Edmans and Liu 2011; Sundaram 
and Yermack 2007). One potential solution to this conflict is to provide debt-like 
compensation to managers so that they become the firm’s inside debtholders. A 
manager’s debt compensation aligns her wealth and therefore her incentives more 
closely with those of outside debtholders (Edmans and Liu 2011). Consistent with 
this theory, empirical research observes decreased risk-taking activities when 
managers’ debt compensation increases (Sundaram and Yermack 2007; Wei and 
Yermack 2011; Cassell et al. 2012; Phan 2014). 
In this study, I test whether and how the level of managers’ debt 
compensation (i.e., their defined benefit pension and deferred compensation) 
affects their incentive for income smoothing.
2
 Based on the framework in Edmans 
and Liu (2011), I expect managers’ debt compensation to affect their alignment 
with the interest of outside debtholders and therefore their incentive to engage in 
discretionary financial reporting. Specifically, as debt compensation decreases, 
managers’ and debtholders’ interest tend to become less aligned. Consequently, the 
risk-taking behavior of managers with lower debt compensation is less likely to be 
                                                 
1
 Unlike debtholders, shareholders have unlimited upside potential from risky decisions and face limited 
losses up to their equity investments. Consequently, shareholders can shift the downside risk of the firm 
to debtholders by encouraging risky investments with high expected returns.
 
 
2
 Defined benefit pension plans and deferred compensation plans are referred to as debt-based executive 
compensation in that they generally represents unsecured and unfunded liabilities for the firm to make 
future payments to top managers after retirement (Wei and Yermack 2011; Sundaram and Yermack 2007; 
Edmans and Liu 2011). Whereas managers usually participate in firms’ ordinary pension plans that are 
federally insured, the vast majority of their pension benefits are covered by supplemental executive 
retirement plans (SERPs). The latter have payouts far exceeding the maximum insured amounts under 
ordinary plans (Sundaram and Yermack 2007).  
3 
in the best interest of debtholders. These managers therefore have an incentive to 
hide their risky behavior from debtholders using opportunistic income smoothing. 
For a sample of 9,060 firm-year observations over the fiscal years 2006 to 
2011 (with data required for future performance through 2014), I use the model in 
Tucker and Zarowin (2006) to determine managers’ incentives for income 
smoothing. Tucker and Zarowin distinguish the informative role of income 
smoothing from the opportunistic role by investigating the association between 
past income smoothing and the predictability of future earnings.
3
 The authors 
indicate that income smoothing associated with more predictable future earnings is 
deemed informative, whereas income smoothing associated with less predictable 
future earnings is considered opportunistic.
4
 
Consistent with my prediction, I find that the association between 
discretionary income smoothing in the past and the predictability of future earnings 
is reduced (i.e., opportunistic income smoothing is stronger) when managers have 
lower debt compensation. This result supports the expectation that when managers 
are provided with lower debt-based compensation, their discretionary income 
smoothing more likely represents an opportunistic attempt to mask the firm’s true 
underlying performance. 
                                                 
3
 Tucker and Zarowin use a prices-leading-earnings model to measure (investors’) predictability of future 
earnings. 
4
 To be clear, I do not predict that reported income will be smoother for firms with low debt-compensated 
managers than for firms with high debt-compensated managers. Income smoothing is not a costless 
earnings management strategy (Trueman and Titman 1988; Fudenberg and Tirole 1995). Previous studies 
suggest that the associated costs of income smoothing include additional tax expenses (Trueman and 
Titman 1988; Chaney and Lewis 1995), disruption of operations (Dye 1988), and litigation charges 
(DuCharme et al. 2004). Firms with low debt-compensated managers are more likely engaging in risky 
activities, and the volatility in performance from these activities is not likely to be completely concealed 
through discretionary income smoothing. 
4 
I extend my analysis on the relation between manager-debtholder incentive 
alignment and opportunistic income smoothing in two settings. Both settings 
involve managers with low debt compensation having stronger incentives to hide 
volatile earnings performance (i.e., opportunistic income smoothing). First, I 
examine the extent to which the firm relies on debt financing. Debtholders of 
highly levered firms are more vulnerable to managerial risk taking in that even a 
small loss could put the firm in financial distress. Consequently, these debtholders 
will likely demand higher borrowing costs when they observe a given level of 
earnings volatility. I expect that as the firm’s reliance on debt financing increases, 
less debt-aligned managers have a stronger incentive to reduce the firms’ perceived 
risk. Consistent with my prediction, I find that opportunistic smoothing by low 
debt-compensated managers increases in firms with higher debt financing. 
My second setting investigates the extent to which debtholders rely on 
financial statement information to assess the firm’s debt repayment ability. I use 
the inverse of analyst coverage to proxy for such reliance based on analysts’ role of 
collecting, analyzing and distributing private information about firm performance. 
Debtholders of a firm with lower analyst coverage will likely rely more on 
information provided on the financial statements.
5
 I expect that as debtholders’ 
reliance on financial statements increases, less debt-aligned managers have a 
stronger incentive to hide the firm’s earnings volatility. Consistent with my 
expectation, I document that opportunistic smoothing by low debt-compensated 
managers increases in firms with lower analyst coverage. 
                                                 
5
 Prior research shows that investors’ reliance on financial statement increases when the firm’s alternative 
communication tunnels are limited (Holthausen and Verrecchia 1988; Kim and Verrecchia 1991; Demski 
and Feltham 1994). 
5 
I conduct a battery of additional analyses to corroborate my primary tests. 
In particular, I find stronger evidence of opportunistic smoothing by managers with 
low debt compensation when the CEO serves as the chairman of the board (i.e., 
CEO duality) or when she has no golden parachute in the change of corporate 
control. I also document that managers with low debt compensation engage in 
more opportunistic smoothing when the firm has a low percentage of independent 
outside directors on board or when the firm’s directors are less debt-aligned. In 
addition, I show that managers with low debt compensation engage in more 
opportunistic smoothing when the firm has low blockholder governance. These 
results overall suggest that weaker corporate governance schemes allow less debt-
aligned managers to engage in greater opportunistic earnings management. In 
addition, my conclusions remain the same given a set of robustness tests, thereby 
lending further credence to the primary findings.  
This study offers several important contributions. First, it provides practical 
implications about debt-based executive compensation, which draws growing 
interest from various parties including investors, auditors, regulators, standard 
setters, taxing authorities, politicians, and the media (Joffe 2015; Weisberg and 
Hoseman 2015; DeVita and Holton 2015). Notably, substantial debtholder losses 
in the most recent recession suggest that agency problems of debt are still a major 
concern and cast doubt on managers’ risk management practices (Bebchuk and 
Spamann 2009; Bhattacharaya and Cohn 2010; Federal Reserve 2009).
6
 In the 
wake of the financial crisis, proposals have been put forward to resolve executive 
                                                 
6
 Large portions of CEOs’ debt compensation were wiped out when their firms collapsed in the crisis. For 
example, General Motor’s ex-CEO Rick Wagoner left the company with pension benefits reduced by 
approximately two-thirds because of the firm’s high-profile bankruptcy (Isidore 2009). 
6 
pay and incentives that promote inappropriate risk taking (SEC 2010). This study 
shows that insufficient debt compensation leads to more opportunistic income 
smoothing, consistent with managers hiding risk-taking activities. These findings 
are informative regarding the contributing factors to managers’ excessive risk 
taking during the financial turmoil (Edmans 2012).
7 
More importantly, they can 
help compensation committees and board members better design and implement an 
efficient compensation contract. Bhagat and Romano (2010) in their proposal for 
executive compensation reform indicate that agency problems generated from 
executive compensation – earnings manipulation or taking on unwarranted risk – 
are a function of the structure of executive payments. My results suggest that lack 
of a debt-based component in executive pay induce opportunistic discretionary 
reporting.  
 
Also, this study complements the strand of research examining the 
incentive effects of executive compensation on managers’ financial reporting 
choices, which has predominantly focused on equity-based compensation (Hanlon 
et al. 2003; Cheng and Warfield 2005; Coles et al. 2006; Armstrong et al. 2010). In 
particular, the evidence presented in this study identifies the influential role of 
debt-based executive compensation in explaining the motive behind managers’ 
income smoothing behavior.
8
 In many settings, is it not clear whether income 
                                                 
7
 For example, Treasury Secretary, Timothy Geithner, addresses in the 2009 U.S. Treasure Budget that 
“… what happened to compensation and the incentives in creative risk taking did contribute … to the 
vulnerability that we saw in this financial crisis.” Federal Reserve Chairman, Ben Bernake, also indicates 
that “Compensation practices at some banking organizations have led to misaligned incentives and 
excessive risk-taking, contributing to bank losses and financial stability.” The SEC discusses in 2010 
Proxy Disclosure Enhancements that the link between risk taking and executive compensation is still not 
well understood. 
8
 Although income smoothing is “overwhelmingly” pervasive in practice, such strong enthusiasm among 
firm executives for earnings smoothness is still not adequately understood (Graham et al. 2005). 
7 
smoothing is beneficial or detrimental. This suggests that no unequivocal 
conclusion can be drawn by simply documenting more or less smoothing as to 
what impact such discretionary reporting has on financial statement users.
9
 The 
results shown in this study therefore shed light on the ongoing discussion over 
whether managers use financial reporting discretion to benefit or harm financial 
statement users (Dechow et al. 2010). Notably, whereas Tucker and Zarowin (2006) 
find that discretionary smoothing is generally driven by an informative intent, I 
document that managers with low debt compensation are more likely to smooth 
earnings for opportunistic reasons.  
Additionally, this study adds to accounting research investigating the 
interactions among executive compensation, managerial accounting choices, and 
corporate debt financing environment (Armstrong, Guay, and Weber 2010). The 
evidence in this study suggests that managers with low debt compensation have 
stronger incentive to engage in opportunistic discretionary reporting when the 
firm’s reliance on debt financing increases. These findings are informative in that 
debt financing has been always a key component of the capital markets.
10
 
Relatedly, Armstrong et al. (2010) strongly encourage research on how 
compensation contracts and corporate governance schemes interact as 
complements or substitutes in disciplining managerial financial reporting. My 
                                                 
9
 Several concurrent studies investigate the impact of managerial debt holdings on earnings management 
behavior. Kalyta (2009) find a positive relation between income-increasing earnings management and 
managers’ performance-based pensions in final pre-retirement years. He (2015) documents that 
managerial debt holdings positively relate to financial reporting quality. Dhole, Manchiraju, and Suk 
(2015) examine the relation between managerial debt compensation and a battery of proxies for earnings 
management behavior including the level of income smoothing. My study is different from these studies 
in that I explicitly test the incentive driving managers’ earnings management (income smoothing in 
particular) behavior.   
10
 In 2009, for example, about $1.1 trillion corporate debt was underwritten, whereas firms issued $263 
billion in equity (SIFMA 2010). 
8 
results indicate that weak corporate governance (i.e., presence of CEO duality, lack 
of executive golden parachutes, inadequate board independence, less debt-aligned 
directors, and weak blockholder monitoring) exacerbates opportunistic smoothing 
by less debt-aligned managers.
11
 
This study proceeds as follows. The next two sections review related 
literature and discuss the hypotheses. Section 4 explains the research design and 
sample selection. Empirical results are presented in Section 5. Sections 6 and 7 
provide additional analyses and robustness tests. The last section concludes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 These findings should be of particular interest to institutional investors given the critical role of 
corporate governance in their investment decisions (Khanna and Zyla 2012). 
9 
2. Background Information 
In this section, I first discuss agency costs arising from managers’ risk-
taking incentives. Then I introduce two opposing explanations for discretionary 
income smoothing practice. In addition, I describe how debt-based executive 
compensation enhances interest alignment between managers and external 
debtholders. 
 
2.1. Managerial Risk-Taking and Agency Conflict with Debtholders 
Previous studies show that self-interested managers extract private benefits 
by making risky operating and investing decisions. For example, a large body of 
research on executive compensation shows that the positive relation between the 
value of option compensation and stock price volatility induces managers to take 
on excessive risk at the expense of firm value (Haugen and Senbet 1981; Hemmer, 
Kim, and Verrecchia 1999; Guay 1999; Nam, Ottoo, and Thornton 2003; Rajgopal 
and Shevlin 2002; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 2006; Low 2009).
12
 Managers are 
also documented to engage in excessive risk taking when they face pressure arising 
from the short-termism in stock markets (Stein 1989, 2003; Bhagat and Romano 
2009). In addition, managers tend to make risky decisions as empire builders to 
serve their private interests including status, power, compensation and prestige 
(Jensen 1986, 1993; Stulz 1990; Chava et al. 2009). 
When managers engage in risky operating and investing activities, 
debtholders receive only limited upside benefits from successful outcomes (up to 
                                                 
12
 The value of stock options represents a convex payoff structure that increases with the volatility of 
stock price (Guay 1999). Such option-based compensation would motivate managers to increase the 
firm’s overall risk beyond a level that is optimal for firm-value maximization.  
10 
interest and principal payments) and have to bear the risk of losing the entire 
investment in case of unfavorable outcomes (Black and Scholes 1973; Merton 
1976). Owing to such non-linear payoff structure, the utility of debtholders 
decreases with the variance of prospective cash flows (Minton and Schrand 
1999).
13
 To the extent that risk-seeking activities introduce large variations in 
operating outcomes, they increase the probability of financial distress and 
undermine the firm’s long-term financial stability. Consequently, agency conflicts 
with debtholders arise when managers adopt risky operating and investing 
strategies that jeopardize the firm’s ability to fulfill debt obligations (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Dewatripont and Tirole 1994; Smith and Stulz 1985; Lambert 
1986). 
 
2.2. Managerial Income Smoothing Incentives 
One means by which managers can reduce stakeholders’ perceived risk of 
the firm is to intentionally use discretionary accruals to offset the effects of volatile 
cash flows. A more stable trend of earnings performance over time reduces 
stakeholders’ uncertainty regarding future firm value (Beaver et al. 1970; Trueman 
and Titman 1988; Gebhardt et al. 2001). There is little doubt that managers employ 
income smoothing in practice (Graham et al. 2005). However, it is not clear as to 
whether such smoothing is helpful or harmful in helping stakeholders understand 
the underlying economic performance of the firm. 
                                                 
13
 Even through outside shareholders receive most of the upside gains from risky investments and 
therefore expect managers to undertake more risk, not all forms of risk and associated volatility 
necessarily fit shareholders’ risk preferences. They still prefer to avoid risky projects that managers 
undertake for private benefits at the expense of firm value (Grant, Markarian and Parbonetti 2009).  
11 
Accounting studies document two opposing views on the motive behind 
managers’ income smoothing practice. On the one hand, managers are motivated to 
convey private expectations on the firm’s long-term performance and help 
financial statement users to assess the permanent component of earnings (Lambert 
1984; Demski 1998; Kirschenheiter and Melumand 2002). In other words, 
managers use financial reporting discretion to reduce earnings fluctuations arising 
from transitory cash flows and better communicate the underlying economic 
performance, thereby giving stakeholders a more accurate picture of the firm’s 
future profitability.
14
 In line with the theory, prior studies provide empirical 
evidence that confirms the informative perspective on income smoothing (Sankar 
and Subramanyam 2001; Gu 2005; Tucker and Zarowin 2006). 
On the other hand, managers can be motivated to extract private benefits by 
lowering risk perceived by outside stakeholders (Healy 1985; Fudenberg end 
Tirole 1995; DeFond and Park 1997; Leuz et al. 2003; Jayaraman 2008). In this 
case, managers take advantage of accounting discretion and attempt to conceal the 
volatility of the firm’s underlying economic performance. In particular, because 
risk-taking activities are likely to be revealed through volatile performance, income 
smoothing represents managerial intent to hide risky operating and investing 
strategies. As a result, such opportunistic smoothing is more likely to be present in 
firms with volatile underlying performance and thus less predictable future 
earnings. 
                                                 
14
 Demksi (1998) shows that managers who can better predict future earnings have incentives to 
demonstrate their predictive power and their aligned interests with firm-value maximization by 
smoothing earnings. He further suggests that to the extent income smoothing is informative, investors are 
better off allowing for such earnings management than if they could prevent it with a costless audit 
technology.  
12 
Tucker and Zarowin (2006) provide an approach to disentangling the 
informative role of income smoothing from the opportunistic role. The authors 
examine the association between past income smoothing and predictability of 
future earnings, where the predictability of future earnings is measured based on 
the extent to which current-year stock returns incorporate information on future 
earnings (Collins et al. 1994).
15
 Specifically, to the extent that managers use 
income smoothing to reduce the effects of transitory cash flows and reveal private 
beliefs about the underlying performance, the smoothness of past earnings should 
be associated with more predictable future earnings. In contrast, if income 
smoothing arises from managerial opportunism to hide excessive risk taking, 
investors will understate the firm’s underlying risk after observing smooth earnings 
streams in the past. Consequently, opportunistic discretionary smoothing is likely 
to be associated with less predictable future earnings. 
Tucker and Zarowin provide empirical evidence that stock prices impound 
more information about future earnings when managers engage in income 
smoothing using discretionary accruals. The authors conclude that managerial 
discretionary income smoothing behavior on average improves the informativeness 
of reported current and past earnings about future earnings and cash flows, thereby 
producing a positive association between income smoothing and future earnings 
predictability. 
 
                                                 
15
 Tucker and Zarowin argue that if managers’ discretionary smoothing practice makes earnings more 
informative about future prospects, then stock returns should impound more information about future 
earnings. In the contrary, if discretionary smoothing merely garbles information, then returns should 
reflect less future earnings information.   
13 
2.3. Debt-Base Executive Compensation 
In this study, I am interested in the impact that debt compensation has on 
managers’ incentive to smooth income. While the majority of prior research 
focuses on equity compensation, debt-based compensation comprises a 
considerable portion of executive pay packages in U.S. firms (Sundaram and 
Yermack 2007; Cassell et al 2012). For example, Wei and Yermack (2011) 
document that 84 percent of CEOs in their sample firms hold debt compensation, 
which sometimes has a greater sum than equity compensation.
16 
 
Managerial debt compensation includes two primary components, defined 
benefit pension and deferred compensation. Defined benefit pension plans are 
accrued under firm-specific formulas and offer executives a fixed amount of 
money per year after retirement. Deferred compensation can be viewed as deferred 
cash benefits managers voluntarily agreeing to withdraw later that they would 
otherwise be entitled to receive now. Deferred compensation is typically paid to 
retired managers in a lump sum (Cassell et al. 2012). Unlike after-retirement 
benefits for regular employees, debt-based executive compensation in general 
represents unsecured and unfunded liabilities for the firm to make future payments 
to top managers and thus can be wiped out in case of insolvency (Wei and 
Yermack 2011; Sundaram and Yermack 2007).
17
 
                                                 
16
 Schultz (2008) reports that debt compensation can be as high as $11.8 billion at Goldman Sach Group 
Inc., $8.5 billion at J.P.Morgan Chase & Co., and $10 to $15 billion at Morgan Stanley.  
17
 Managers usually participate in firms’ ordinary tax-qualified pension plans that are available for most 
employees and are insured by the federal Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). For U.S. 
companies, however, federally insured pension benefits are only a small fraction of the amount due to top 
executives. The vast majority of their pension benefits fall under supplemental executive retirement plans 
(SERPs). SERPs are not tax-qualified and do not have a PBGC guarantee since the payouts far exceed the 
maximum insured amounts under ordinary plans (Sundaram and Yermack 2007). As for deferred 
14 
Starting from fiscal year 2006 and onwards, the SEC requires U.S. firms to 
provide detailed disclosures on debt compensation for top executives.
18 
Motivated 
by this regulatory change, recent finance research has begun to examine the 
implications of managerial debt compensation. Built on the agency theory in 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Edmans and Liu (2011) establish the first 
comprehensive theory that debt compensation leads to interest alignment between 
managers and external debtholders through eliciting the sensitivity of managerial 
personal wealth to the firm’s bankruptcy risk and the liquidation value.  
In line with the theory, empirical studies provide evidence that managers 
with lower debt-based compensation and engage in higher risk actions. For 
example, Sundaram and Yermack (2007) document that CEOs with lower debt 
compensation have a lower “distance-to-default” measure. Cassell et al. (2012) 
find that firms providing lower debt compensation have higher research and 
development expenditures, less firm diversification, and higher asset liquidity. 
Phan (2014) show that when managers are provided with lower debt compensation, 
they are less likely to diversify using mergers and acquisitions.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
compensation plans, they may occasionally be funded using devices including the “rabbi” trust, but these 
assets are controversial and are unprotected if the company faces claims form other creditors.  
18
 The SEC explicitly stated that additional disclosures on pension benefits and deferred compensation 
permit a better understanding of the company’s compensation obligations to named executive officers. 
Also, they indicate that the absence of such a disclosure requirement results in the understatement of non-
performance-based compensation and distorts pay comparisons between executives and between 
companies (SEC 2006). 
15 
3. Hypothesis Development 
3.1. Debt-Based Executive Compensation and Income Smoothing Incentive 
My first hypothesis explores how managers’ income smoothing incentive 
changes with the level of their debt compensation. Risky operating and investing 
strategies tend to produce volatile firm performance and thus jeopardize a firm’s 
ability to make timely debt repayments for a given period. This volatility elicits 
adverse reactions from debtholders (Robert and Sufi 2009b; Nini et al. 2012).
19
 
Consequently, managers have incentives to hide risk-pursuing activities from 
debtholders through estimates of discretionary accruals. 
My prediction is built on the theory that the incentive alignment between 
managers and outside debtholders is weakened when debt-based executive 
compensation is low. Specifically, risk-pursuing activities of managers with low 
debt compensation are less likely to be in the best interest of debtholders. To 
reduce agency costs imposed by debtholders, these managers have a strong 
incentive to conceal the firm’s volatile underlying economic performance using 
financial reporting discretion. Therefore, I expect discretionary income smoothing 
by less debt-aligned managers to represent an attempt of hiding excessive risk 
taking. Such opportunistic use of discretionary accruals is more likely to be present 
in firms with less predictable future earnings.
20 
 
                                                 
19
 Debtholders’ adverse responses include increased interest costs, accelerated maturity periods, tightened 
collateral requirements, and stronger borrowing restrictions (Collins et al. 1981; Lys 1984; Imhoff and 
Thomas 1988; Rajan and Winton 1995; Harris and Raviv 1995; Amiram and Owen 2012; Li 2013; Zhang 
2008). Another costly consequence, although less commonly observed, is that debtholders terminate the 
lending agreement immediately (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Beneish and Press 1993; 1995). 
20
 To be clear, the firm-specific effect of opportunistic smoothing is to reduce the volatility of reported 
performance, which could lead to more predictable future performance for the firm (compared to not 
smoothing at all). However, my prediction is made in the cross section. Specifically, I predict that firms 
with riskier operations are the ones engaged in opportunistic smoothing. Riskier operations are, on 
16 
The preceding argument forms my first hypothesis: 
H1: Opportunistic income smoothing increases as debt-based executive 
compensation decreases. 
 
3.2. Debt-Based Executive Compensation and Opportunistic Income Smoothing 
In this section, I investigate two settings where managers with low debt 
compensation have stronger incentives to hide risk taking from debtholders by 
engaging in opportunistic income smoothing. More specifically, I explore the 
firm’s reliance on debt financing and debtholders’ reliance on financial statement 
information. 
 
3.2.1. Debt Financing 
Debtholders receive limited gains from managers’ risky actions yet have to 
share the entire loss.
21
 The more debt financing a firm uses, the higher are the debt 
obligations that the firm must meet, and the greater the likelihood that the firm will 
experience financial distress (Myers 1984; Altman 1984). To the extent that using 
greater debt financing raises the likelihood that bankruptcy will occur, debtholders 
of highly levered firms are more sensitive to managers’ risk-seeking activities 
because even a small loss can lead the firm to bankruptcy. Consequently, for a 
                                                                                                                                               
average, associated with more volatile performance and therefore less predictable future earnings. Thus, 
in the cross section, opportunistic smoothing suggests that firms with greater past income smoothing will 
have less predictable future earnings. 
21
 When a firms is at risk of financial distress, shareholders can shift the downside risk of the firm to 
debtholders by encouraging managers to undertake risky investments with high expected returns (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976; Myers 1977; John and John 1993). Examples of research on shareholders’ risk-
shifting problems includes Klock et al. (2005), Bryan et al. (2006), Francis et al. (2010) and King and 
Wen (2011). 
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given level of earnings volatility, the firm will likely face higher borrowing costs 
as its external debt increases. 
I expect that as the firm’s reliance on debt financing increases, less debt-
aligned managers have stronger incentives to hide risk-taking decisions from 
debtholders. In other words, these managers are more likely to reduce earnings 
volatility arising from risky recurring activities in an attempt to mitigate agency 
costs of debt.
22
 This indicates that managers with low debt compensation tend to 
engage in greater opportunistic smoothing in firms with higher debt financing. The 
preceding discussion leads to H2a: 
H2a: The negative relation between debt-based executive compensation 
and opportunistic income smoothing is greater as debt financing increases.  
 
3.2.2. Analyst Coverage 
Analysts are well-known for their role of collecting, analyzing and 
distributing private information about firm performance (Yu 2008). Analyst reports 
have been widely viewed as a prominent information source that potentially 
competes with financial statements (Givoly and Lakonishok 1979; Lys and Soo 
1995; Hong et al. 2000; Gleason and Lee 2003; Lim 2001; Lang, Lin and Miller 
2003; Brown and Higgins 2002). Consistent with this view, empirical research 
documents a negative relation between analyst following and subsequent market 
                                                 
22 
Prior research shows that income smoothing provides the firm with great flexibility to stay in covenant 
compliance over a long period of time (Carson and Bathala 1997; Chaney et al. 1998; Demerjian et al. 
2015).
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reactions to earnings announcements (Shores 1990; Frankel and Li 2004; 
Lehyavey et al. 2009; Chen, Cheng, and Lo 2010).
23
 
Debtholders rely on earnings information to assess the firm’s debt 
repayment ability (Smith and Warner 1979; Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Files, 
Lys, and Vincent 2001; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Demerjian 2007). I expect 
that as analyst following decreases, the firm’s debtholders will rely more on 
financial statements to reduce uncertainty over the unobservable economic 
performance. As a result, less debt-aligned managers have stronger incentives to 
hide earnings volatility induced by risky actions. This suggests that managers with 
low debt compensation will likely engage in greater opportunistic smoothing in 
firms with lower analyst coverage. The preceding analysis leads to H2b: 
H2b: The negative relation between debt-based executive compensation 
and opportunistic income smoothing is greater as analyst coverage decreases. 
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 Analytical research indicates that investors increase reliance on financial statement information when 
alternative communication tunnels of firm performance are limited (Holthausen and Verrecchia 1988; 
Kim and Verrecchia 1991; Demski and Feltham 1994). 
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4. Research Design and Sample 
4.1. Variable Measurement 
4.1.1. Debt-Based Executive Compensation 
Debt-based executive compensation is measured as the ratio of the 
aggregate value of the CEO’s debt compensation scaled by the value of her annual 
total compensation at the beginning of the year. The CEO’s debt compensation 
equals to the present value of defined benefit pension plans plus the aggregate 
balance in non-qualified deferred compensation plans. The components of her 
annual total compensation include salary, bonus, stock and option awards, debt-
based benefits, non-equity incentive plans and other compensation. The ratio can 
be interpreted as the relative importance of the CEO’s debt compensation to her 
firm-specific wealth. An indicator variable for low debt compensation (LDComp) 
is set to one if the debt compensation ratio is below the sample’s median, and zero 
otherwise.
24
 
 
4.1.2. Discretionary Income Smoothing 
 To measure managers’ use of discretionary accruals to smooth income 
(IS), I calculate the correlation between the change in discretionary accruals (DA) 
and the change in pre-discretionary income (PDI) over the five previous years, 
where PDI is measured as income before extraordinary items less DA. I multiply 
IS by minus one so that a higher value of IS represents a greater degree of 
discretionary smoothing. To control for industry and year effects, I convert IS into 
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 For firms with missing data on CEO debt compensation, I assume that debt compensation equals zero 
and assign the value of one to LDComp. As a sensitivity test, I delete firm-years with missing data on 
managerial debt holdings. This reduces the sample size but does not alter the conclusion.   
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fractional rankings within each industry-year.
25
 The estimation of DA is based on a 
modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model that accounts for asymmetric timelier 
recognition of unrealized losses (Ball and Shivakumar 2006): 
 
Accrualst = α0 + α1OCFt−1 + α2OCFt + α3NegOCFt + α4OCFt*NegOCFt + 
α5OCFt+1 + α6ΔSalest + α7PPEt + εt 
(1) 
 
As shown in model (1), total accruals (Accruals) are calculated as the 
difference between income before extraordinary items and operating cash flows 
(OCF). I modify the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model by including the growth in 
sales (∆Sales) and property, plant, and equipment (PPE) for the current year 
(McNichols 2002) and by allowing the coefficient on OCF in the current year to 
vary between observations with positive and negative amounts (NegOCF). I 
estimate model (1) for each industry-year (defined by two-digit SIC code) with at 
least ten observations, and the residuals represent DA.
26, 27
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 A fractional ranking is defined as the raw rank of the income smoothing variable divided by the total 
number of observations within each industry-year and has a range between 0 and 1.  
26
 The results are qualitatively similar when I use industry-year combinations with at least 20 or 30 
observations.  
27 
Tucker and Zarowin (2006) estimate discretionary accruals using the model in Kothari et al. (2005). 
Dechow et al. (2012), however, indicate that the Kothari et al. model have relatively weak power and may 
lead to highly misspecified standard t-tests. Inferences are unchanged when I use the Kothari et al. model. 
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4.2. Model Specification 
4.2.1. Income Smoothing Incentive and Future Earnings Predictability 
To distinguish the informative role of income smoothing from its 
opportunistic role, Tucker and Zarowin (2006) adopt a prices-leading-earnings 
model (Collins et al. 1994): 
 
Rt = β0 + β1Xt−1 + β2Xt + β3Xt3 + β4Rt3 + εt (2) 
 
In model (2), Rt represents the current year’s stock return and aggregates all 
publicly available information. Xt−1 and Xt are earnings per share (EPS) for the past and 
current years, respectively, and control for unexpected earnings in the current year.
28 
Xt3 
equals the sum of EPS for years t+1 to t+3 and measures future earnings expectations. 
All EPS measures are scaled by the stock price at the beginning of year t. Because using 
realized future earnings (Xt3) as a proxy for expectations in the current year could 
introduce measurement error problems, realized future stock returns for years t+1 
through t+3 (Rt3) are included to control for unexpected future events. 
The coefficient on Xt3 is referred to as the future earnings response coefficient 
(FERC) and reflects the extent to which information about future earnings is impounded 
in current stock returns. To the extent that FERC captures revisions in investors’ 
expectations of future profitability, a higher FERC implies higher predictability of 
firms’ future earnings. To examine managerial income smoothing incentive, Tucker and 
Zarowin (2006) estimate model (3): 
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 Including Xt-1 and Xt is analogous to including the level and change in current earnings to account for 
unexpected earnings (Lundholm and Myers 2002) 
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Rt = β0 + β1Xt−1 + β2Xt + β3Xt3 + β4Rt3 + β5ISt  
        + β6ISt*Xt−1 + β7ISt*Xt + β8ISt*Xt3 + β9ISt*Rt3 + εt 
(3) 
  
The authors document a positive coefficient on the interaction term ISt*Xt3 and 
conclude that income smoothing practice using discretionary accruals on average is 
associated with more predictable earnings. This finding is consistent with the 
informative role of income smoothing. 
 
4.2.2. Primary Model 
To test the relation between low debt compensation on the incentive to smooth 
income, I add LDComp to model (3) and construct model (4) as follows: 
 
Rt = β0 + β1Xt−1 + β2Xt + β3Xt3 + β4Rt3 + β5ISt + β6ISt*Xt−1 + β7ISt*Xt + 
β8ISt*Xt3 
      + β9ISt*Rt3 + β10LDCompt−1 + β11LDCompt−1*Xt−1  
      + β12LDCompt-1*Xt + β13LDCompt−1*Xt3 + β14LDCompt−1*Rt3 
      + β15LDCompt−1*ISt + β16LDCompt-1*ISt*Xt−1  
      + β17LDCompt−1*ISt*Xt + β18LDCompt−1*ISt*Xt3  
      + β19LDCompt−1*ISt*Rt3 + γnControlsn + δnControlsn*ISt*Xt3 + εt 
(4) 
  
The variable of interest in models (4) is the three-way interaction term 
LDCompt−1*ISt*Xt3.
29
  H1 predicts that low debt compensation will lead to more 
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 When estimating model (4), I also calculate IS over the previous three years and take the average of 
LDComp during the same three-year period (i.e., a three-year smoothing measure is examined in 
23 
opportunistic income smoothing. Therefore, I expect a negative coefficient on 
LDCompt−1*ISt*Xt3. This results would suggest that the association between past 
discretionary income smoothing and future earnings predictability is lower for firms 
offering low debt-based executive compensation. 
To test H2a, I split the sample into two groups based on the firm’s debt 
financing level, which is calculated as total debt divided by total assets at the beginning 
of the fiscal year.
30
 The low (high) debt financing group includes firm-year observations 
with debt financing levels lower than or equal to (greater than) the median value of the 
sample. I estimate Model (4) using the two subsamples respectively and compare the 
coefficient on LDCompt−1*ISt*Xt3 between the two groups. If the impact of low 
managerial debt compensation on opportunistic income smoothing increases with 
corporate debt financing, I expect that the high debt financing group has a more 
negative β18 than the low debt financing group. 
To test H2b, I divide the sample into two groups based on the firm’s analyst 
coverage level, which is measured by the average number of analyst following during 
the fiscal year. The low (high) analyst coverage subsample includes firm-year 
observations with analyst following levels lower than or equal to (greater than) the 
median value of the sample. I estimate Model (4) using the two subsamples respectively 
and compare the coefficient on LDCompt−1*ISt*Xt3 between the two groups. If the 
negative relation between managerial debt holdings and opportunistic income 
                                                                                                                                               
conjunction with a three-year compensation measure) to mitigate the noise in the matching process 
(Grant, Markarian and Parbonetti 2009). For this alternative specification, my conclusions remain the 
same. 
30
 I also adopt interest coverage ratio as an alternative measure of a firm’s debt financing obligations, 
which is calculated as total interest expenditure divided by operating income. The results remain 
qualitatively similar.  
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smoothing decreases with corporate analyst coverage, I expect that the low analyst 
following group has a more negative β18 than the high debt financing group. 
I include in Model (4) a vector of control variables that are documented to 
reflect firm characteristics and/or affect financial reporting quality (Klein 2002; Hribar 
and Nichols 2007; Francis et al. 2004).
31
 These variables are firm size (Size), cash flow 
volatility (CashVol), firm leverage (Leverage), sales growth (Growth), the market-to-
book ratio (MB), firm profitability (Profit), investment intensity (Invest), asset 
tangibility (PPE), analyst coverage (Analyst), and loss incidence (Loss). I also include 
CEO tenure (Tenure) and CEO age (Age) given their influential role in determining the 
value of managerial debt compensation (Cassell et al. 2012). Additionally, because 
managers’ equity compensation has been documented widely to affect financial 
reporting quality (See Armstrong et al. 2013 for a review), I control for managerial 
equity-based incentive (EquityComp).
32
 The appendix provides detailed variable 
descriptions.  
 
4.3. Sample Selection 
Starting in 2006, the SEC requires detailed disclosures on debt-based executive 
compensation. My initial sample is extracted from Execucomp, which provides data on 
defined benefit pensions and non-qualified deferred compensation for top executives in 
the S&P 1500 index. I further identify firm-year observations with sufficient accounting 
and finance data in Compustat, I/B/E/S, Institutional Shareholder Service (ISS, formerly 
RiskMetrics), and Thomson Reuters to estimate the variables required for my empirical 
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 In addition to accounting for the main effects of the control variables, I also interact them with ISt*Xt3. 
32
 Shu and Thomas (2015) show that equity compensation affects managerial income smoothing incentive.  
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analyses. To mitigate effects of extreme observations, all continuous variables are 
winsorized at their 1st and 99th percentiles. Given that information on CEOs’ debt 
holdings was not publicly available until fiscal year 2006, my sample period spans from 
2006 to 2011.
33
 Based on the preceding procedure, the final sample consists of 9,060 
firm-year observations. 
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 I collect data for fiscal years 2006 to 2014. The sample period ends in 2011 because three future years 
of earnings and returns are required to estimate Model (4). 
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5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 provides summary statistics for the variables used in my 
empirical analyses. Earnings and returns variables are in general consistent with those 
reported in Tucker and Zarowin (2006). The average Rt of my sample firms is 0.118, 
while they report an average value of 0.153 for stock returns. The mean (median) value 
of Xt in my sample is 0.021 (0.053), relative to the mean (median) of 0.015 (0.047) for 
their sample firms. Xt3 for my sample firms has a mean (median) value of 0.132 (0.165), 
compared to the mean (median) of 0.074 (0.125) in their sample. Given that Tucker and 
Zarowin (2006) use Compustat firms and this study focuses on firms reported on 
Execucomp, these results are consistent with Execucomp firms being more profitable 
than the population of firms on Compustat (LaFond and Roychowdhury 2008).
34
  
The correlation matrix is shown in Panel B of Table 1. The correlations between 
the indicator variable for low debt compensation and control variables for firm 
characteristics are consistent with previous findings (He 2015; Cassell et al. 2012; 
Cadman and Vincent 2014). That is, firms that provide managers with lower debt 
compensation are smaller and less profitable, have lower leverage and higher market-to-
book ratio, and have more research and development expenses and higher cash flow 
volatility. In addition, consistent with previous research on the prices-leading-earnings 
model, Rt is negatively correlated with Xt-1 and Rt3, and is positively correlated with Xt 
and Xt3 (Collins et al. 1994; Tucker and Zarowin 2006). 
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 Untabulated statistics show that the mean (median) of my sample CEO’s debt compensation is $8.22 
million ($3.03 million) and that the mean (median) of annual change in the value of debt compensation is 
$1.11 million ($0.44 million). The mean (median) of the ration of debt compensation to equity 
compensation is 0.59 (0.25).  
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5.2. Regression Results 
5.2.1. Test Results for H1 
Table 2 presents test results of my first hypothesis. As predicted, the main 
effects of the variables used in the prices-leading-earnings model remain consistent with 
previous research after the indicator variable for low managerial debt compensation is 
incorporated. For instance, both the ERC and the FERC are significantly positive, 
which indicates information about current and future earnings being impounded in 
current stock returns (Collins et al. 1994). 
Consistent with my prediction, the coefficient on the three-way interaction 
LDCompt−1*ISt*Xt3 is negative and statistically significant (–0.4409). This suggests that 
the association between past income smoothing and the predictability of future earnings 
is lower for firms that provide low debt-based executive compensation. This result is 
consistent with managers with low debt compensation using opportunistic income 
smoothing to conceal risk-taking activities.
35
 Nevertheless, such opportunistic 
smoothing behavior will be associated with more volatile (i.e., less predictable) future 
earnings. Consequently, the relation between past income smoothing and future 
earnings predictability decreases when managers with low debt compensation 
opportunistically manipulate accruals.  
In contrast, the significantly positive coefficient (0.2182) on the two-way 
interaction ISt*Xt3 confirms the findings in Tucker and Zarowin (20006). This suggests 
that when managers with higher debt compensation use discretionary accruals to 
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 The implication of my findings is that managers with low debt compensation have stronger incentives 
to engage in risky activities. Whereas prior research documents a negative relation between debt-based 
executive compensation and managerial risk-taking, I test and find a negative (positive) effect of debt 
compensation on the firm’s R&D expenditures (working capital), thereby confirming insufficient debt 
compensation eliciting risk-taking.  
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smooth earnings, they tend to reveal private information on the firm’s underlying 
performance and help financial statement users predict future earnings. 
 
5.2.2. Test Results for H2a and H2b 
Table 3 provides test results of H2a and H2b. The results for the variables used 
in the prices-leading-earnings model remain qualitatively similar when the sample is 
split into two groups based on the firm’s debt financing and analyst coverage, 
respectively. Specifically, Column 2 and Column 3 of Table 3 present results for H2a. 
Whereas the coefficient on LDCompt−1*ISt*Xt3 remains significant and negative for 
both the high debt financing group and the low debt financing group, it is more negative 
for the subsample with high debt financing. This finding indicates that when the firm’s 
reliance on debt financing (relative to equity financing) increases, managers with low 
debt compensation have stronger incentive to engage in opportunistic income 
smoothing. Results for H2b are provided in Column 4 and Column 5 of Table 3. 
Whereas the coefficient on LDCompt−1*ISt*Xt3 is significant and negative for the low 
analyst coverage group, it becomes insignificant and negative for the high analyst 
coverage group. These findings suggest that when the firm has low analyst following, 
managers with low debt compensation are more likely to smooth earnings for the 
purpose of hiding risk. 
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6. Additional Analyses 
To corroborate the findings in the previous section, I further test the relation 
between debt-based executive compensation and opportunistic income smoothing based 
on corporate governance schemes related to the CEO, directors and blockholders. 
 
6.1. CEO Characteristics 
6.1.1. CEO Duality 
The CEO of a U.S. firm commonly serves as the chairman of the board 
(Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell 1997). Such duality provides the CEO with more power 
and greater discretion (Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen 1993; Carver 1990; Millstein 
1992; Worrell, Nemec, and Davidson 1997). Moreover, concentrated decision-making 
power makes it possible for the CEO to control information flows among other board 
members, potentially impending the board’s oversight and governance functions 
(Brickley et al. 1994; Frinkelstein and D’Aveni 1994; Cadbury Committee Reports 
1992). Accounting studies document a negative relation between CEO duality and 
financial reporting quality (Gul and Leung 2004; Klein 2002; Farber 2005). 
To explore whether CEO duality allows less debt-aligned managers to engage in 
greater opportunistic income smoothing, I split the sample based on the presence of 
duality and estimate model (4) using the two subsamples. Results in Penal A of Table 4 
shows that whereas the coefficient on LDCompt−1*ISt*Xt3 remains significant and 
negative for the group of CEOs with duality, the coefficient becomes insignificant and 
positive for the group of CEOs without duality. This finding is consistent with CEO 
30 
duality impairing board independence and constraining the board’s ability to restrain 
managerial opportunism. 
 
6.1.2. CEO Golden Parachute 
Top executives sometimes receive large amounts of payments (i.e., golden 
parachutes) when their employment is terminated due to some type of “change in 
corporate control” (Fich, Tran, and Walking 2013; Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang 2014; 
Rau and Xu 2013).
36
 Prior studies find that golden parachutes reduce agency costs in 
that they encourage managers to accept investor wealth-maximizing takeovers even if 
the change in control leads to employment termination (Gary and Cannella 1997; 
Lambert and Larcker 1985; Singh and Harianto 1989). In particular, Tirole (2006) 
considers a situation where managers manipulate earnings signals in an attempt to hide 
poor performance and avoid job termination. Tirole then demonstrates that golden 
parachutes reduce earnings manipulation by increasing managerial payoff in liquidation.  
I expect that without golden parachutes, less debt-aligned managers will likely 
have stronger incentives to hide risk-taking behavior through manipulating 
discretionary accruals. I collect information on the provision of golden parachutes from 
ISS. I split the sample into two groups based on the presence of CEO golden parachutes 
and estimate model (4) using the two subsamples. Results in Panel A of Table 4 show 
that the coefficient on LDCompt−1*ISt*Xt3 is significantly more negative for the 
subsample in which the CEO has no golden parachutes. This finding is consistent with 
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 Examples of a change in corporate control include purchase of a substantial block of outstanding stock, 
a change in the majority of the Board of Directors, and acquisition of the company by an unrelated party 
(Lambert and Larcker 1985).  
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managers with low debt compensation engaging in greater opportunistic smoothing in 
the absence of golden parachutes.  
 
6.2. Director Characteristics 
6.2.1. Director Independence 
Prior studies document that independent outside directors monitor the 
management more effectively and thus better protect investors (Brickley et al. 1994; 
Byrd and Hickman 1992; Rosenstein and Wyatt 1990; Weisbach 1988). Accounting 
research documents a negative link between director independence and the incidence of 
financial fraud or earnings manipulation (Dechow et al. 1996; Beasley 1996; Klein 
2002; Xia, Davidson, and DaDalt 2003).
37
  
To test the impact of director independence on the relation between debt-based 
executive compensation and opportunistic smoothing, I split the sample based on the 
sample median of the proportion of independent outside directors on board. I collect 
data on director classification from ISS, where independent outside directors are defined 
as those with no material connect to the company other than a board seat.
38
 I estimate 
model (4) using the two subsamples. Results in Panel B of Table 4 indicate that the 
coefficient on LDCompt−1*ISt*Xt3 is significantly more negative for the group where 
independent outside directors hold a lower percentage of board seats. This finding 
indicates that when boards are staffed with inside or affiliated directors, less debt-
aligned managers tend to engage in more opportunistic smoothing. 
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 Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2004) show that debtholders consider the board of directors one of the 
most important factors influencing financial reporting integrity and document a negative relation between 
director independence and the cost of debt. 
38
 The other two types of board affiliations defined by ISS are inside/employee directors and 
affiliated/linked outside directors.  
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6.2.2. Director Debt Compensation 
Director compensation can be used to increase incentive alignment between 
directors and outside stakeholders (Ronen, Tzur, and Yaari 2006; Magnan, St-Onge, 
and Gelinas 2010). The degree of such alignment affects directors’ efficacy in 
overseeing the management (Brick, Palmon, and Warld 2006; Linn and Parker 2005; 
Yermack 2004). Ronen et al. (2006) find that directors with higher equity compensation 
are more tolerant of earnings manipulation to the extent that they can extract benefit 
from insider trading.  
I expect less debt-aligned directors to be more tolerant of managerial attempt to 
hide risk-taking from debtholders via discretionary smoothing. Information on director 
compensation is collected from ExecuComp. I first calculate the ratio of the change in 
the director’s debt compensation scaled by her annual total compensation, and then split 
the sample based on the sample median of this ratio. I estimate model (4) using the two 
subsamples respectively. Results in Panel B of Table 4 show that the coefficient on 
LDCompt−1*ISt*Xt3 remains significant and negative for both groups, but is significantly 
more negative for directors with low debt compensation. This finding supports that 
managers with low debt compensation are more likely to engage in opportunistic 
smoothing when the firm’s directors are less aligned with debtholders. 
 
6.3. Blockholder Ownership 
Blockholders reduce agency costs and improve firm value through efficiently 
monitoring and disciplining the management (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997; Holderness 2003, 2009; Edmans 2014). Owing to various monitoring 
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costs, it is economically more beneficial for investors with concentrated ownership to 
exert governance on the management.
39
 I expect that lower monitoring from 
blockholders creates more opportunities for managers to manipulate reported earnings 
and hide self-interested actions. 
To test the effect of blockholder governance, I collect information on 
blockholders from Thomson Reuters Institutional (13f) Holdings. Two proxies for the 
monitoring strength of blockholders are employed.
40
 The first measure is the number of 
institutional investors with block ownership of at least 5 percent in a firm, and the 
second measure is the total ownership by institutional blockholders scaled by the firm’s 
outstanding shares. I split the sample into two groups based on the sample median of the 
number of blockholders and the total ownership by blockholders, respectively. Panel C 
of Table 4 provides the results. The coefficient on LDCompt−1*ISt*Xt3 remains 
significant and negative for the below-the-median group, whereas the coefficient is 
insignificant for the above-the-median group. This finding is consistent with less debt-
aligned managers engaging in greater opportunistic income smoothing when the firm 
has lower blockholder ownership. 
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 Prior research shows that blockholders limit managers’ opportunistic behavior through intervention 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Admati, Pfleiderer, and Zechner 1994) and/or threat to exit (Edmans 2009; 
Edmans, Fang, and Zur 2013; Dou et al., 2015). 
40
 Edmans and Mango (2011) suggest that a multiple blockholder structure is more efficient as a 
governance mechanism through increasing the power of trading.  
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7. Robustness Tests 
7.1. Earnings Persistence Model 
Prior research suggests that earnings persistence, ceteris paribus, reflects current 
earnings’ ability to impound information on future earnings (Dechow et al. 2010). To 
the extent that opportunistic income smoothing is associated with less predictable future 
earnings, it should also relate to a less positive relation between future earnings and 
current earnings.  
Tucker and Zarowin (2006) use the following model to explore the relation 
between income smoothing and earnings persistence.  
 
Xt3 = γ0 + γ1ISt + γ2Xt + γ3ISt*Xt + εt (5) 
 
The authors document a positive coefficient on the two-way interaction ISt*Xt 
and conclude that income smoothing in general enhancing earnings persistence. In this 
study, I investigate whether the relation between income smoothing and earnings 
persistence varies with the level of CEOs’ debt compensation. I use this earnings-based 
test to complete my returns-based test of earnings predictability by incorporating 
LDComp into model (5):  
 
Xt3 = α0 + α1ISt + α2Xt + α3ISt*Xt + α4LDCompt−1 + α5LDCompt−1*ISt + 
                     α6LDCompt−1*Xt + α7LDCompt−1*ISt*Xt + γControls +  
                     δControls*ISt*Xt + εt 
(6) 
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I expect a negative coefficient on the three-way interaction LDCompt−1*ISt*Xt if 
managers with low debt compensation use discretionary accruals-based income 
smoothing to hide excessive risk. Results in Table 5 show that the coefficient on 
LDCompt−1*ISt*Xt is significant and negative, thereby further validating the results in 
my primary test. 
 
7.2. Alternative Measures 
To allow greater cross-sectional variations, I construct a continuous measure of 
managerial debt compensation LDComp1. I first calculate the ratio of the change in 
aggregate value of the CEO’s debt compensation scaled by the value of her annual total 
compensation at the beginning of the fiscal year. I multiply this ratio by minus one so 
that a higher value of LDComp1 indicates a lower proportion of debt compensation in 
the compensation package. Prior studies show that managerial option holdings 
encourage excessive risk taking (Rajgopal and Shevlin 2002; Coles et al. 2006) and are 
associated with opportunistic income smoothing (Shu and Thomas 2015). To assess the 
importance of debt-based compensation relative to option-based benefits in influencing 
managers’ discretionary smoothing incentive, I adopt a measure of debt-to-option 
compensation LDComp2. Specifically, I calculate the value of the CEO’s debt 
compensation scaled by the value of her option compensation, multiplied by minus one. 
I take the natural logarithmic transformation of LDComp1 and LDComp2 to account for 
36 
skewness of executive compensation data. Untabulated results indicate that my 
inferences continue to hold.
41
 
To lend further credence to my primary analysis, I adopt an alternative measure 
of discretionary accruals-based income smoothing following Demerjian et al. (2015). 
Specifically, I calculate an indicator variable that is set to one if the absolute value of 
the change in reported earnings is lower than the absolute value of the change in non-
discretionary income in both year t and year t–1. Non-discretionary income is measured 
as net income minus discretionary accruals. I find similar result using this measure. 
 
7.3. Decomposition of Debt-Based Executive Compensation 
The finance literature shows that managers sometimes are permitted to make 
changes in how their deferred compensation is invested (Wei and Yermeck 2011).
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Moreover, the firm may provide managers with opportunities under limited 
circumstances to withdraw their deferred compensation before retirement 
(Anantharaman, Fang, and Gong 2014). Such flexibility weakens the debt nature of 
deferred compensation and may bias the incentive alignment effect. 
To address the potential misclassification of deferred compensation as 
representing debt-based executive compensation, I examine a subsample of firms that 
disclose both defined benefit pension and deferred compensation. I estimate model (4) 
after decomposing CEOs’ debt compensation into defined benefit pension and deferred 
compensation. Untabulated results show that whereas the coefficient on 
                                                 
41
 As another robustness test, I also calculated the aggregate value of the CEO’s debt compensation scaled 
by the firm’s total assets, which provides a firm-level measure of managerial leverage. Results remain 
qualitatively similar.  
42
 For example, deferred compensation can be invested at a fixed rate of return, in the firm’s stock, or in 
stock or bond mutual funds (Wei and Yermack 2011). 
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LDCompt−1*ISt*Xt3 is significantly more negative for pensions, it remains significant 
and negative for deferred compensation. This confirms that my findings are not driven 
entirely by CEOs’ defined benefit pension plans. 
 
7.4. Endogeneity 
I adopt different approaches to address endogeneity issues. First, to alleviate 
concerns of my findings being driven by unobservable variables that relate to both debt-
based executive compensation and income smoothing incentive, I control for a battery 
of factors that are documented by prior accounting and finance literature to affect the 
design of executive compensation and the firm’s earnings quality. I find qualitatively 
similar results with or without these control variables. I also address the problem of 
omitted correlated variables by including firm fixed effects, which rule out 
unobservable, time-invariant firm-specific factors driving my findings. My results 
continue to hold. 
Second, the research design in Tucker and Zarowin (2006) mitigates concerns 
over reverse causality from income smoothing to managerial debt compensation. 
Instead of testing a simple correlation between debt compensation and the practice of 
income smoothing, I examine how debt-based executive compensation affects 
managers’ income smoothing incentive (i.e., the relation between income smoothing 
behavior and the predictability of future earnings). In other words, the interaction effect 
of LDCompt−1*ISt*Xt3 on stock returns Rt makes reverse causality less likely because 
one would need to offer an explanation as to why debt compensation is expected to 
decrease as opportunistic income smoothing increases.  
38 
Thirdly, I employ a series of cross-sectional tests to show that results are 
stronger for subsamples where the relation between debt compensation and 
opportunistic smoothing is expected to be more pronounced. I document that less debt-
aligned managers are engaged in greater opportunistic smoothing when the firm’s 
(debtholders’) reliance on debt financing (financial statement information) is higher. 
Reverse causality is less likely given that results are stronger for subsamples where 
theory and empirical evidence suggest they should (Rajan and Zingales 1998; Lang and 
Maffett 2011). In addition, I find a unifying theme that the relation between low debt 
compensation and opportunistic income smoothing is stronger in firms with weak 
corporate governance schemes. This suggests that my results are less likely driven by 
some omitted variables in every cross-sectional regression. 
Finally, to tackle the endogeneity concern in a more direct way, I estimate a 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) framework. Following prior literature, I adopt two 
instrumental variables, the maximum state tax rate on individual income and the 
industry-year median of debt-based executive compensation (Cassell et al. 2012; 
Anantharaman et al. 2014).
43
 Managers working in jurisdictions with higher income tax 
are more willing to accept debt-based compensation so that they can defer associated 
tax burden to a later point in time. That is, managers can derive substantial tax savings 
from income deferral if they relocate to jurisdictions with lower income tax rate after 
retirement (Chason 2006; Bruce, Fox, and Yang 2010). I consider the industry-year 
median of debt-based executive compensation because the executive compensation 
contract of a given firm is typically influenced by industry practice (Murphy 1999). 
                                                 
43
 State tax rates are obtained from http://www.nber.org/~taxsim/state-rates/.  
39 
Untabulated results based on 2SLS analyses are consistent with those using ordinary-
least-squares (OLS) estimation.
44
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44
 To implement the 2SLS approach, I first estimate debt-based executive compensation as a function of 
the two selected instruments and then estimate model (4) using the predicted values of  debt 
compensation obtained from the first-stage estimation. Other control variables are defined in Appendix.  
40 
8. Conclusions 
This study examines the informative role versus the opportunistic role of income 
smoothing in a context where managers’ incentive alignment with debtholders is 
expected to vary. The accounting literature provides mixed evidence on whether 
managers use income smoothing to help stakeholders better predict future performance 
or alternatively, mask risk-taking activities that harm stakeholders. While managers 
have the potential to gain from risky activities, debtholders share only in the losses. The 
agency theory suggests that a debt-like component in executive compensation creates 
interest alignment between managers and outside debtholders (Edmans and Liu 2012; 
Cassell et al. 2012; Wei and Yermack 2011). This in turn suggests that when managers 
have lower debt compensation, the incentive alignment between managers and 
debtholders tends to be lower. Risk-taking activities of less debt-aligned managers are 
less likely to be in the best interest of debtholders. Consequently, these managers have a 
stronger incentive to hide risky actions using discretionary income smoothing.  
I adopt the approach in Tucker and Zarowin (2006) to differentiate the incentive 
behind managers’ income smoothing behavior. Consistent with my predictions, I find 
that managers with lower debt compensation engage in more opportunistic income 
smoothing. I also show that less debt-aligned managers engage in greater opportunistic 
smoothing as the firm’s reliance on debt financing increases and as outside debtholders’ 
reliance on financial statements increases. My results are stronger in subsamples where 
theory and empirical evidence suggest they should. I document a stronger relation 
between debt compensation and opportunistic smoothing when (1) the CEO serves as 
the chairman of the board or has no golden parachutes, (2) the board has lower director 
41 
independence or less debt-aligned directors, and (3) the firm has lower blockholder 
governance. My conclusions are robust to measuring earnings predictability using an 
earnings persistence model, using alternative measures of debt-based executive 
compensation and discretionary accruals-based income smoothing, decomposing CEO 
debt compensation, and using different methods to address endogeneity. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Distributions of Variables (N=9,060) 
Variables 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
P10 
 
P25 
 
P50 
 
P75 
 
P90 
(1) Rt 0.1181 0.4968 –0.4120 –0.1647 0.0709 0.3145 0.6457 
(2) Xt-1 –0.0030 0.2503 –0.0642 0.0228 0.0475 0.0666 0.0934 
(3) Xt 0.0206 0.1529 –0.0686 0.0238 0.0525 0.0744 0.1031 
(4) Xt3 0.1319 0.3130 –0.1845 0.0510 0.1650 0.2575 0.3837 
(5) Rt3 0.4270 0.8762 –0.4330 –0.0396 0.3446 0.7486 1.2889 
(6) IS 0.5558 0.2835 0.1400 0.3182 0.5789 0.8012 0.9286 
(7) LDComp 0.5000 0.5000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5000 1.0000 1.0000 
(8) Size 7.6381 1.6768 5.5388 6.4507 7.5300 8.7466 9.9829 
(9) CashVol 0.0868 0.0730 0.0251 0.0402 0.0661 0.1070 0.1719 
(10) Leverage 0.1794 0.1787 0.0000 0.0039 0.1486 0.2828 0.4171 
(11) Growth 0.0931 0.2206 –0.1432 –0.0115 0.0767 0.1748 0.3273 
(12) MB 1.8507 1.0389 1.0000 1.1683 1.5157 2.1500 3.0994 
(13) Profit 0.0470 0.0974 –0.0426 0.0189 0.0528 0.0944 0.1432 
(14) Invest 0.0774 0.0700 0.0097 0.0286 0.0586 0.1041 0.1687 
(15) PPE 0.2635 0.2372 0.0315 0.0801 0.1831 0.3876 0.6547 
(16) Analyst 2.0588 0.8526 0.8109 1.6260 2.1972 2.6912 3.0245 
(17) Loss 0.1702 0.3758 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
(18) Age 3.9477 0.5647 3.8501 3.9318 4.0254 4.1109 4.1744 
(19) Tenure 1.7537 0.8532 0.6931 1.0986 1.7918 2.3026 2.8332 
(20) EComp 2.7557 1.1721 1.2484 1.9944 2.7239 3.4616 4.2694 
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Table 2 
Debt-Based Executive Compensation and Opportunistic Income Smoothing 
Variables Coefficient Estimate p-value 
Intercept –0.2037 0.0053 
Xt-1 –0.5681 <.0001 
Xt  0.4749 <.0001 
Xt3  0.4479 0.0010 
Rt3 –0.1014 <.0001 
ISt –0.0424 0.1032 
ISt*Xt-1  0.0862 0.5373 
ISt*Xt             0.0726 0.7344 
ISt*Xt3            0.2182 0.0047 
ISt*Rt3            0.0059 0.8361 
LDCompt-1  0.0009 0.9921 
LDCompt-1*Xt-1  0.0636 0.2707 
LDCompt-1*Xt –0.1403 0.2519 
LDCompt-1*Xt3  0.1202 0.0269 
LDCompt-1*Rt3  0.0123 0.5326 
LDCompt-1*ISt –0.0443 0.2071 
LDCompt-1*ISt*Xt-1 –0.4815 0.0150 
LDCompt-1*ISt*Xt  1.2328 <.0001 
LDCompt-1*ISt*Xt3 –0.4409 <.0001 
LDCompt-1*ISt*Rt3  0.0003 0.9937 
Size  0.0103 0.0452 
CashVol –0.2276 0.0419 
Leverage –0.0423 0.2278 
Growth  0.1728 <.0001 
MB  0.0937 <.0001 
Profit –0.5113 0.0003 
Invest –0.3545 0.0032 
PPE  0.1795 <.0001 
Analyst –0.0403 <.0001 
Loss –0.0026 0.9141 
Age  0.0126 0.3557 
Tenure –0.0207 0.0105 
Ecomp  0.0206 0.0028 
Controls*ISt*Xt3 Yes Yes 
Adj. R
2
               0.4508 
N                 9,060 
Table 2 provides test results for H1. The dependent variable is the annual stock return 
(Rt). Along with coefficient estimates, two-sided p-values are presented. Standard errors 
are clustered by firms. Year fixed effect indicators are not reported for brevity. A 
detailed description of all variables employed is provided in the Appendix. 
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Table 3 
Cross-Sectional Tests on the Relation between Debt-Based Executive 
Compensation and Opportunistic Income Smoothing 
 Debt Financing Analyst Coverage 
Variables High Low High Low 
Intercept –0.1121*** –0.3024*** –0.2115*** –0.3111*** 
Xt-1 –0.7385*** –0.4954*** –0.4699*** –0.5962*** 
Xt   0.9515***   0.3360***   0.5641***   0.3755*** 
Xt3   0.4075***   0.6075***   0.7479***   0.3535*** 
Rt3 –0.1397*** –0.0816*** –0.0885*** –0.1161*** 
ISt –0.0256*** –0.0310*** –0.0322*** –0.0649*** 
ISt*Xt-1   0.2113*** –0.0099*** –0.0915***   0.1949*** 
ISt*Xt            –0.3632***   0.2359***   0.9778*** –0.2176*** 
ISt*Xt3             0.3217***   0.2790***   0.0545***   0.2267**** 
ISt*Rt3             0.0420*** –0.0201*** –0.0113***   0.0237*** 
LDCompt-1 –0.0066*** –0.0062***   0.1184***   0.0350*** 
LDCompt-1*Xt-1   0.1048***   0.0572*** –0.1305***   0.1298*** 
LDCompt-1*Xt –0.3914*** –0.0960***   0.0014*** –0.1503*** 
LDCompt-1*Xt3   0.1344***   0.0875***   0.0676***   0.1069*** 
LDCompt-1*Rt3   0.0460*** –0.0171***   0.0047***   0.0279*** 
LDCompt-1*ISt –0.0812***   0.0022*** –0.0426*** –0.0182*** 
LDCompt-1*ISt*Xt-1 –0.2678*** –0.6879***   0.1682*** –0.8060*** 
LDCompt-1*ISt*Xt   1.9709***   0.6320*** –0.2993***   1.7569*** 
LDCompt-1*ISt*Xt3 –0.6171*** –0.2766*** –0.1256*** –0.4850*** 
LDCompt-1*ISt*Rt3 –0.0437*** 0.0491**   0.0240*** –0.0372*** 
Controls Yes Yes 
Controls*ISt*Xt3 Yes Yes 
Adj. R
2
 0.4689 0.4533 0.4812  
F-Test 4.71** 18.49*** 
N 4,530 4,530 4,515 4,545 
Table 3 provides test results for H2a and H2b. *, **, and *** represent two-sided 
significance levels at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01. The dependent variable is the annual stock 
return (Rt). Standard errors are clustered by firms. Year fixed effect indicators are not 
reported for brevity. A detailed description of all variables employed is provided in the 
Appendix. 
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Table 4 
Tests on Debt-Based Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance 
Characteristics, and Opportunistic Income Smoothing 
Panel A:  
CEO Characteristics 
 
 
CEO Duality 
 
CEO Golden Parachute 
Variables Yes No Yes No 
Intercept –0.3451*** –0.1124***   1.1528*** –0.1982*** 
Xt-1 –0.8514*** –0.2992*** –0.5552*** –0.6670*** 
Xt   0.5422***   0.3397***   0.8579***   0.5006*** 
Xt3   0.2982***   0.2025*** –3.2981***   0.4928*** 
Rt3 –0.0953*** –0.1079*** –0.1960*** –0.0832*** 
ISt –0.1090***   0.0200*** –0.0444*** –0.0562*** 
ISt*Xt-1   0.7050*** –0.5195*** –0.6840***   0.5569*** 
ISt*Xt            –0.4827***   0.4388***   0.3077*** –0.1721*** 
ISt*Xt3             0.5324*** –0.0409***   0.3168***   0.2298*** 
ISt*Rt3           –0.0126***   0.0179***   0.0646*** –0.0114*** 
LDCompt-1   0.1446*** –0.0667*** –0.8875****   0.0561*** 
LDCompt-1*Xt-1   0.2668*** –0.1084***   0.2675***   0.1384*** 
LDCompt-1*Xt –0.5103***   0.3008***   0.9320*** –0.2083*** 
LDCompt-1*Xt3   0.3992*** –0.1516*** –0.0496***   0.1624*** 
LDCompt-1*Rt3 –0.0261***   0.0749***   0.0238***   0.0036*** 
LDCompt-1*ISt   0.0151*** –0.1062*** –0.0071*** –0.0388*** 
LDCompt-1*ISt*Xt-1 –1.1060***   0.2202*** –0.4822*** –0.7918*** 
LDCompt-1*ISt*Xt   2.2732***   0.4646***   1.4425***   1.1881*** 
LDCompt-1*ISt*Xt3 –1.0159***   0.1677*** –0.3879*** –0.4438*** 
LDCompt-1*ISt*Rt3   0.0815*** –0.1103*** –0.0271***   0.0023*** 
Controls Yes Yes 
Controls*ISt*Xt3 Yes Yes 
Adj. R
2
 0.469 0.462 0.399 0.448 
F-Test 17.13*** 5.43** 
N 4,369 4,691 2,990 5,824 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
Tests on Debt-Based Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance 
Characteristics, and Opportunistic Income Smoothing 
Panel B:  
Director Characteristics 
 Director Independence 
Director Debt 
Compensation 
Variables High Low High Low 
Intercept –0.0372***   1.1851*** –0.2060*** –0.2093*** 
Xt-1 –0.6192*** –0.5599*** –0.5784*** –0.5744*** 
Xt   0.5721***   1.2048***   0.5258***   0.4585*** 
Xt3 0.1632***   4.1424***   0.4713***   0.2273*** 
Rt3 –0.1452*** –0.0949*** –0.1011*** –0.1005*** 
ISt –0.0508*** –0.0905*** –0.0191*** –0.0488*** 
ISt*Xt-1 –0.4437*** –1.7115***   0.1315***   0.0898*** 
ISt*Xt              0.0522*** 1.1756** –0.1397***   0.0983*** 
ISt*Xt3             0.6409***   0.9560***   0.1935***   0.2352*** 
ISt*Rt3           –0.0584*** –0.1011***   0.0066***   0.0076*** 
LDCompt-1   0.9956*** –1.2333***   0.0042*** –0.1272*** 
LDCompt-1*Xt-1   0.0452***   0.3505***   0.0780***   0.1080*** 
LDCompt-1*Xt   0.9703*** –0.4582*** –0.1986*** –0.3949*** 
LDCompt-1*Xt3   0.2053***   0.7048***   0.1128***   0.1898*** 
LDCompt-1*Rt3   0.1034***   0.0514***   0.0136*** –0.0094*** 
LDCompt-1*ISt   0.1559***   0.0913*** –0.0675*** –0.0402*** 
LDCompt-1*ISt*Xt-1   0.2499***   0.1687*** –0.5078*** –0.7817*** 
LDCompt-1*ISt*Xt   1.0259***   1.5521***   1.4684***   1.7804*** 
LDCompt-1*ISt*Xt3 –0.7916*** –1.3511*** –0.4266*** –0.6015*** 
LDCompt-1*ISt*Rt3 –0.0412***   0.0366*** –0.0012***   0.0469*** 
Controls Yes Yes 
Controls*ISt*Xt3 Yes Yes 
Adj. R
2
 0.569 0.589 0.523 0.464 
F-Test 13.98*** 16.08*** 
N 4,794 4,266 4,148 4,913 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
Tests on Debt-Based Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance 
Characteristics, and Opportunistic Income Smoothing 
Panel C:  
Blockholder Ownership 
 
Number of Institutional 
Blockholders 
Institutional Blockholder 
Ownership 
Variables High Low High Low 
Intercept –0.2130*** –0.2387*** –0.1948*** –0.2456*** 
Xt-1 –0.6336*** –0.4818*** –0.4424*** –0.6200*** 
Xt   0.6935***   0.2669***   0.7806***   0.4242*** 
Xt3   0.3190***   0.5144***   0.0534***   0.5416*** 
Rt3 –0.0929*** –0.1012*** –0.0957*** –0.0952*** 
ISt   0.0305*** –0.0872***   0.0363*** –0.0693*** 
ISt*Xt-1 –0.2920***   0.1473*** –0.7406***   0.4826*** 
ISt*Xt              0.1444***   0.2969***   0.8172*** –0.5004*** 
ISt*Xt3             0.1245***   0.2405*** –0.0570***   0.3834*** 
ISt*Rt3           –0.0105***   0.0151***   0.0121*** –0.0246*** 
LDCompt-1 –0.0611***   0.1294*** –0.2345***   0.1833*** 
LDCompt-1*Xt-1   0.3485*** –0.1184***   0.3470***   0.0865*** 
LDCompt-1*Xt –0.4803***   0.0726*** –0.3801*** –0.1609*** 
LDCompt-1*Xt3   0.0599***   0.1726***   0.1224***   0.1272*** 
LDCompt-1*Rt3 –0.0026***   0.0030***   0.0175***   0.0010*** 
LDCompt-1*ISt –0.1186*** –0.0130*** –0.0138*** –0.0800*** 
LDCompt-1*ISt*Xt-1 –0.5186*** –0.3905*** –0.6911*** –0.8317*** 
LDCompt-1*ISt*Xt   1.8342***   0.7693***   0.8872***   1.7253*** 
LDCompt-1*ISt*Xt3 –0.1702*** –0.6042*** –0.1752*** –0.6053*** 
LDCompt-1*ISt*Rt3   0.0649*** –0.0270***   0.0054***   0.0250*** 
Controls Yes Yes 
Controls*ISt*Xt3 Yes Yes 
Adj. R
2
 0.494 0.433 0.499 0.437 
F-Test 7.40*** 4.62** 
N 4,204 4,856 4,001 5,059 
Table 4 provides subsample test results based on corporate governance characteristics. 
The dependent variable is the annual stock return (Rt). *, **, and *** represent 
significance levels at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 (two-sided). Year fixed effect indicators are 
not reported for brevity. A detailed description of all variables employed is provided in 
the Appendix. 
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Table 5 
Test on Debt-Based Executive Compensation and Earnings Persistence 
Variables Coefficient Estimate p-value 
Intercept   0.0130 0.7475 
ISt –0.1543 <.0001 
Xt   0.2137 0.0001 
ISt*Xt              3.0186 <.0001 
LDCompt-1   0.0055 0.5070 
LDCompt-1*Xt –0.0075 0.0072 
LDCompt-1*ISt –0.0740 <.0001 
LDCompt-1*ISt*Xt –0.1433 <.0001 
Size –0.0065 0.0790 
CashVol   0.4332 <.0001 
Leverage –0.0508 0.0440 
Growth –0.0115 0.5498 
MB   0.0332 <.0001 
Profit –0.2062 0.0201 
Invest –0.4244 <.0001 
PPE   0.1201 <.0001 
Analyst   0.0050 0.4006 
Loss –0.0352 0.0391 
Age   0.0200 0.0015 
Tenure   0.0145 0.0085 
Ecomp –0.0126 0.0050 
Controls*ISt*Xt                  Yes 
Adj. R
2
                 0.212 
N                 9,060 
Table 5 provides test results for the earnings persistence model. The dependent variable 
is the cumulative earnings over the subsequent three years (X3t). Along with coefficient 
estimates, two-sided p-values are presented. Standard errors are clustered by firms. Year 
fixed effect indicators are not reported for brevity. A detailed description of all variables 
employed is provided in the Appendix. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Test Variables 
Rt Annual ex-dividend stock returns for year t. 
Xt-1 Earnings per share (Compustat epspx, adjusted for stock splits and stock 
dividends) at the end of year t-1, scaled by the stock price at the 
beginning of fiscal year t. 
Xt Earnings per share (Compustat epspx, adjusted for stock splits and stock 
dividends) at the end of year t, scaled by the stock price at the beginning 
of year t. 
Xt3 The sum of earnings per share (Compustat epspx, adjusted for stock splits 
and stock dividends) for years t+1 through t+3, scaled by the stock price 
at the beginning of year t. 
Rt3 The annually compounded stock return for years t+1 through t+3. 
ISt The correlation between change in discretionary accruals (DA) and 
change in pre-discretionary income (PDI) over previous five years, 
multiplied by minus one. PDI is calculated as net income before 
extraordinary items (Compustat ibc) for year t scaled by total assets 
(Compustat at) at the beginning of year t minus discretionary accruals for 
year t. DA are the residuals from the following regression.  
Accrualst = α0 + α1OCFt-1 + α2OCFt + α3NegOCFt + α4OCFt*NegOCFt 
+ α5OCFt+1 + α6∆Salest + α7PPEt + ωt  
Accrualst is equal to net income before extraordinary items (Compustat 
ibc) for year t minus operating cash flows OCFt (Compustat oancf) for 
year t, scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t; NegOCFt is an 
indicator variable that is equal to one if OCFt is negative and zero 
otherwise; ∆Salest is the annual change in sales (Compustat sales) from 
year t to year t-1 scaled by total assets (Compustat at) at the beginning of 
year t; and PPEt is the gross property, plant and equipment for year t 
(Compustat ppegt) scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t 
(Compustat at).  
LDCompt-1 An indicator variable that takes the value of one if the aggregated value of 
the CEO’s defined benefit pensions (Execucomp pension_value_total) 
plus deferred compensation (Execucomp defer_balance_total) scaled by 
CEO annual total compensation (Execucomp total_sec) is greater than the 
sample mean at the end of year t-1, and zero otherwise. 
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Control Variables  
Size The natural logarithm of total assets (Compustat at) at the beginning of 
the fiscal year. 
CashVol The standard deviation of operating cash flows (Compustat oancf) over 
the previous five years. 
Leverage The ratio of total debt (Compustat dlc+dltt) to total assets (Compustat at) 
at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
Growth The annual percentage change in sales (Compustat sales) at the beginning 
of the fiscal year. 
MB The ratio of the market value of total assets (Compustat csho*prcc_f+at–
ceq) over the book value of total assets (Compustat at) at the beginning of 
the fiscal year.  
Profit The ratio of net income before extraordinary items (Compustat ibc) over 
total assets (Compustat at) at the beginning of the fiscal year 
Invest The ratio of research and development expenses (Compustat xrd) plus 
capital expenditures (Compustat capx) minus sales of fixed assets 
(Compustat sppe) over total assets (Compustat at) at the beginning of the 
fiscal year. 
PPE The ratio of net property, plant and equipment (Compustat ppent) over 
total assets (Compustat at) at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
Analyst The natural logarithm of one plus the average number of analyst 
following at the beginning of the fiscal year (I/B/E/S). 
Loss An indicator variable that is equal to one if the firm has negative earnings 
per share (Compustat epspx, adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends) 
at the end of the fiscal year, and zero otherwise. 
Age The natural logarithm of one plus the age of the CEO at the beginning of 
the fiscal year (Execucomp age)  
Tenure The natural logarithm of one plus the difference between the year of the 
observation and the year in which the executive became CEO 
(Execucomp becameceo). 
Ecomp The natural logarithm of one plus the ratio of CEO stock awards 
(Execucomp stock_awards) and option awards (Execucomp 
option_awards) divided by CEO total compensation (Execucomp 
total_sec) at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
 
